REGINA v BRADLEY 1980 ZLR 107 (G)

Author: Trodat Zimbabwe

REGINA v BRADLEY 1980 ZLR 107 (G)

1980 ZLR p107

Citation                 1980 ZLR 107 (G)

Case No                Details not supplied

Court                    General Division, Salisbury

Judge                    Smith, J

Flynote

Road Traffic Act, 1976 — section 48 (1) (a) — unlawfully getting on to, interfering with or damaging vehicle — whether bicycle a vehicle. F

Headnote

A bicycle is a vehicle for the purposes of section 48 (1) (a) and (3) of the Road Traffic Act, 1976. _G

The accused had been convicted in a magistrates Court of the theft of a bicycle, but his intention to steal the bicycle had not been established.

Held that in terms of section 48 (3) of the Road Traffic Act, 1976, the conviction should be altered to one of getting on to or interfering with a vehicle in contravention of section 48 (1) (a) of the Act. H

Cases cited

R v Wilson, 1955 RLR 550 (GD)

Judgment

Smith J: The accused was found guilty of the theft of a delivery cycle and was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment with labour, the whole of which was suspended for five years on the usual conditions. The

1980 ZLR p108

Smith J

record has been submitted by the Regional Magistrate who scrutinized it, because he was of the opinion that the intention to steal had not been established and that the accused’s explanation that he intended to go for _A a joy­ride on the bicycle might reasonably be true.

The presiding magistrate has set out the facts that are common cause, in his minute. At about 2.30 a.m. the complainant was sitting outside Herald House in Salisbury with about ten colleagues, waiting to be issued _B with newspapers. Their bicycles, including that of the complainant, were parked about 10 metres away from the group. The accused, who had been drinking but who knew what he was doing, approached alone on foot. He then took hold of the complainant’s delivery cycle and started to walk off with it. Before he had gone more than five metres, the complainant _C and his colleagues noticed this and they shouted “thief” in Shona. The accused then ran along, pushing the cycle. He was chased by the complainant and the over newspaper vendors, and he then dropped the cycle. The accused continued to run but was apprehended and handed over to the Police. The accused said that he wanted to “go for a joy ride” _D on this bicycle. At one stage he said “round the block” and at another “to the Cathedral and back”.

Certain features which weighed with the magistrate in disbelieving the accused’s explanation were, in addition, why he did not ask permission _E if he simply wanted to go for a joy­ride and why he had persisted in running away pushing the bicycle after he had been discovered. As to that, the accused’s explanation was that he feared that he would be beaten up because he heard shouting which he could not understand and so panicked and ran. Furthermore, according to the complainant’s evidence, _F the accused did not then give the explanation which he gave to the Court. On the other hand, there is the feature that accused’s approach was entirely open, that the bicycle was standing only 10 metres away from the group of persons and that there was no real possibility of his taking it without being detected. It should also be borne in mind that the _G accused had been drinking and it is not clear to what extent he was under the influence of alcohol. In view of the fact that it was 2.30 a.m., however, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he had spent a considerable time drinking. While there are­as the presiding magistrate has noted ­ flaws in the explanation of the accused, it seems to me that _H the other features which I have mentioned must leave one with the conviction that the intention to steal was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, that is to say, that there is a reasonable possibility that the accused’s explanation is true.

1980 ZLR p109

Smith J

Section 48 (1) (a) of the Road Traffic Act, 1976, provides that a person who without reasonable excuse gets on to a vehicle or interferes with or _A wilfully damages a vehicle or its accessories, is guilty of an offence. It is also provided in subsection (3) of that section that a person charged with the theft of a vehicle may be found guilty of an offence in terms of subsection (1). A bicycle falls within the ordinary meaning of “vehicle”, and there is authority for the proposition that riding a cycle negligently is a _B contravention of section 43 (1) (a), which refers to a “vehicle”. R v Wilson, 1965 RLR 550 (AD). Furthermore, section 46 of the Act, which makes it an offence to drive a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a drug to such extent as to be incapable of having proper control of it, differentiates with regard to penalties between “vehicle” and “motor _C vehicle”. Subsection (4) of the section provides that where the conviction involves the driving of a motorvehicle while under the influence of alcohol, certain penalties relating to prohibition from driving and to the cancellation of licences shall apply. These penalties do not apply where the offence involves a vehicle other than a motor­vehicle This section _D indicates that the word “vehicle” has a wide meaning.

I am therefore satisfied that a verdict of guilty of a contravention of section 48 (1) (a) Is competent and is warranted by the facts. Accordingly, the conviction of theft is set aside and a conviction of contravening section 48 (1) (a) of the Road Traffic Act, 1976, as substituted. The sentence _E remains appropriate and Is confirmed.

Waddington J: agrees.