THE STATE v SIMON 1980 ZLR 162 (G)
1980 ZLR p162
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Citation |
1980 ZLR 162 (G) |
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Case No |
Details
not supplied |
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Court |
General Division, Salisbury |
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Judge |
Dumbutshena
J |
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Heard |
25th June, 1980 |
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Judgment |
25th June, 1980 |
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Counsel |
Details
not supplied |
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Case Type |
Criminal
Review |
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Annotations
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Link to
case annotations |
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Flynote
Criminal procedure — splitting
of charges — tests for — accused C impersonating policeman in
order to commit robbery — whether may be charged with both impersonation and
robbery.
Headnote
The accused, pretending to be a
policeman, had purported to arrest two women and, while they were in his
custody, he had used his ostensible authority to rob them of certain property.
He was convicted in a magistrates Court of two D counts of robbery
and one of impersonating a policeman in contravention of section 70 (1) (a) of
the Police Act [Chapter 98]. On review.
Held, setting aside the conviction for
impersonation, that there had been an unlawful splitting of charges, since the
robberies and the impersonation had been committed with one criminal intent and
constituted one continuous E criminal transaction, and the evidence
necessary to establish the robberies involved proving the impersonation.
Cases cited
R v Tarewa, 1949 SR 158? 1949 (4) SA 347 (SR)?
R v
Malako, 1959 (1) SA 569 (O)?
AttorneyGeneral v Jakubec, 1979 RLR 267 (AD)? 1980 (2) SA
884 (RAD)? F
S v
Brereton, 1970 (2) RLR 272 (AD)?
R v Peterson and Ors 1970 (1) RLR 49 (AD)? 1971 (2) SA 130
(R).
Judgment
Dumbutshena J: The accused was charged with two counts of
robbery and one count of contravening section 70 (1) (a) of the Police G Act
[Chapter 98] as follows:
Firstly, Robbery in that upon the 2nd
day of May, 1980, and on the dust road near Mucheke River in the Mucheke
Township, Fort Victoria, in the said Province, the said accused did wrongfully
and H unlawfully assault one Filomina Chagonda, a person there being,
with open hands upon the face and with booted feet upon her body, and did then
and there with force and violence take from the said
Filomina Chagonda a certain headdress and a blanket, the
property
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1980
ZLR p163
Dumbutshena J of and in the lawful possession
of the said Filomina Chagonda, and thus the said accused did rob the said
Filomina Chagonda of A the same.
Secondly, Charged with the crime of robbery in that upon the
2nd May, 1980, and on the dust road near Mucheke River in the Mucheke Township,
Fort Victoria, in the said Province, the said accused did wrongfully and
unlawfully assault Kerina Moyo, a person there being, B and did
forcibly grab her, and did then and there with force, violence and threats of
violence take from the said Kerina Moyo the sum of two dollars, the property
and in the lawful possession of the said Kerina Moyo and thus the said accused
did rob the said Kerina Moyo of the same. C
Thirdly, Charged with the crime of contravening section 70
(1) (a) of the Police Act [Chapter 98] in that upon the 2nd May, 1980, and at
the Bus Terminus in Mucheke Township, Fort Victoria, in the said Province, the
said accused, not being a member of the British South D Africa
Police, did wrongfully and unlawfully pretend by words and conduct that he was
a member of the British South Africa Police.
He pleaded not guilty and was found guilty on all three
counts. He was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment with labour on each of
the two counts of robbery. Of the total of 18 months’ imprisonment with labour E
for the two counts of robbery, six months were suspended for five years
on condition that accused “does not commit within that period any offence
involving dishonesty or assault for which he is sentenced to imprisonment
without the option of a fine”. On count 3 he was sentenced to three months’
imprisonment with labour “the whole of which is to run F concurrently
with the sentences imposed on Courts 1 and 2”.
Briefly, the facts are that on the
night in question the accused pretended to be a policeman. He went to a bus
terminus accompanied by one Mutsena. The complainants were at the bus terminus.
The accused G held himself out as a policeman. He kicked the feet of
the complainants and ordered them to stand up. He then accused them of being
thieves and implied that he had arrested other thieves in that area. He ordered
them off to the cells. When the complainants seemed to doubt the accused’s role
as a policeman, he produced a book from his pocket and H implied
that the book was his police identity document. The complainants went with
accused into the bush, along the road. It appears from the evidence that
accused demanded money whilst marching the complainants along the road. He sent
the second complainant ahead with Mutsena. He himself demanded money from the
first complainant, who
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told him she had none. He slapped her and threatened to take
her to the cells and injure her. He then forcibly removed from her, her blanket
and her jersey. She finally escaped. The accused hid the blanket. Accused A
went to the second complainant who was with Mutsena. He threatened to
beat her in the manner he had beaten up the first complainant unless she
produced some money. The second complainant produced $2 from her bra. The
accused took it from her.
On the evidence as disclosed in the record it is clear that
accused held B himself out as a policeman in order to induce the
complainants to part with their property or money. The criminal acts thus
separately charged, that is, the two counts of robbery on the one hand and the
contravention of section 70 (1) (a) of the Police Act on the other hand, were
done with one criminal intent and constituted one continuous criminal
transaction, C and the evidence necessary to establish the two
counts of robbery involved proving the impersonation. See R v Tarewa, 1949 SR
158? 1949 (4) SA 347 (SR) at 348? R v Malako, 1959 (1) SA 569 (O.).
The rule against the splitting of
charges and the basic tests as D to whether or not there has or
there has not been a splitting of charges, were laid down by LEWIS, JP, in the
recent case of Attorney
General v Jakubec, 1979 RLR 267 (AD) at 270G? 1980 (2) SA
884 (ZRAD) at 886F, where he says:
“The rule against splitting of charges and the tests
as to whether or not E there has been a splitting of charges were considered
at length in the leading case of S v Grobler and Another, 1966 (1) SA 507 (AD),
which was followed in the General Division of this Court by the former Chief
Justice, BEADLE CJ, and GREENFIELD J, in the case of R v Peterson and Others,
1970 (1) RLR 49 (GD) at 51? 1971 (2) SA 130 (R) at 131. In the lastquoted
case, BEADLE CJ, at page 51G (page 131D of the South African report), F after
quoting with approval a passage in the judgment of WESSELS, JA, in Grobler’s
case supra, said this:
‘In the earlier cases to which the learned Judge
referred with approval, two basic tests are set out. One is that where a man
commits two acts of which each standing alone would be criminal but does so
with a single G intent, and both acts are necessary to carry out that
intent, then he should only be convicted of one criminal offence. Another
commonly applied test, which is a useful one in certain circumstances, is that
the same evidence which is essential to prove one criminal act should not be
used again as essential evidence to prove another. Where the essential evidence
in such cases proves two criminal acts, only one should be charged’ H
There are
thus two tests which may be applied and, as was pointed out in Grobler’s case
at 523E, the test to be applied is that which, according to the circumstances
and on a common sense basis, is best calculated to achieve the object of the
rule.”
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1980
ZLR p165
Dumbutshena J
I invited comments from the AttorneyGeneral on the improper
or otherwise splitting of charges in the present case. I am indebted to the A
Director of Public Prosecutions for his comments that appear below:
“It would appear from the record that the accused’s
actions in holding him self out to be a policeman were designed to instil fear
in the complainants with a view to the perpetration of further crimes upon
them, namely robbery. As a result those actions, which would normally found a
charge of contravening the Police Act are in this matter part and parcel of the
subsequent B crimes.
The approach to be used in such cases was laid down by
the Appellate Division in the case of S v Brereton,
1970 (2) RLR 272 (AD) where it was said at page 277A: C
‘In such cases, where the accused, in pursuance of the
dominant intention, commits a number of offences, the proper thing to do is to
charge him only with that offence which was his dominant purpose.’
In the circumstances, it is conceded that the
conviction and sentence on count three, that of contravening section 70 (1) (a)
of the Police Act [Chapter 98] should be set aside.” D I
agree with those views.
A splitting of charges resulting in a duplication of
convictions also results in prejudice to the accused when next he is convicted
of a relevant E offence and his previous convictions are taken into
consideration for purposes of assessing sentence. See R v Peterson &
Others, 1970 (1) RLR 49 (GD) at 51AE, 1971 (2) SA 130 (R) at 131AC.
In this case the learned magistrate improperly convicted the accused on
all the three counts. As the offence of robbery is more serious than the F
statutory offence of impersonating a policeman, the conviction and
sentence on count three should be set aside. The convictions and sentences on
counts 1 and 2 are confirmed but the conviction and sentence or count 3 are set
aside.
My brother Waddington agrees with this judgment.
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